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Economic growth occurs whenever people take resources and rearrange
them in ways that are more valuable.
—Paul Romer, “Economic Growth”
T
he world does not appear to make sense. If it did, Botswana would be as
miserable and poor as its neighbor Zambia. Instead, Botswana’s standard of
living of more than $13,000 per person is more than eight times higher, its
literacy rate is 12 percentage points greater, and its infant mortality rate is 68 percent
lower (World Bank 2010). According to many conventional theories of development,
Botswana would never be a candidate for success: it is a sparsely populated country
that does not enjoy economies of scale or scope in manufacturing. It is landlocked,
with high transactions costs for interacting with global markets. The terrain consists
of many deserts and swamps that limit agriculture, but it allows for small and large
cattle pastures. Botswana was a British protectorate until 1966 and retained local
elites after independence. The country does have diamonds, but other African nations
with valuable resources suffer civil wars over them; oil-rich Libya has stable political
rule but languishes with roughly the same standard of living today as it had thirty
years ago. Despite all the odds, Botswana somehow made the list of the thirteen top
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“success” stories heralded by the Commission on Growth and Development (2008);
it was the only African country to be so honored.
What is the secret of Botswana’s success? Is it a fluke, a happy accident? Or is
Botswana’s feat the result of sensible government plans and policies? If institutions
and policies play a reliable role in creating economic progress, can these constructs be
readily transferred to other countries? The answers to these questions are not simple.
Although markets and stable governments are associated with growth, it is nearly
impossible to say how a particular institution or policy would fare in a new legal,
cultural, and social setting without supportive complementary institutions and poli-
cies. Like transplanted human organs, some institutional transplants are rejected.
After sixty-five years of promoting development through financing capital flows to
developing countries, the World Bank’s own economists despair over their failure to
generate growth in Africa (Easterly 2007). Predictions across borders are notoriously
poor, and numerous countries followed the “right” policy advice to no avail (see, for
example, Stiglitz 2003).
Alfred Marshall (1920) famously insisted that economics is more like biology
than physics. Societies are organic ecologies that evolve and produce organized but
unplanned complexity (Hayek 1979). Although no public policy reliably produces
economic growth across all ecosystems, a key element unites diverse institutions and
policies that do seem to work: they all are reasonably compatible with human instinct.
Institutions that build on the basic instinct for self-betterment (as in markets) have a
much easier time in achieving success than institutions that oppose it (as in commu-
nism). Instincts, like gravity, are a force of nature. Adam Smith theorized, for exam-
ple, that the natural propensity to “truck, barter, and exchange” ([1776] 1981, 25)
initially arose not from the impulse for financial reward, but from the social urge to
share beliefs and to persuade others (1982a, 493). Exchange spurs growth because it
is compatible with deep human intuitions. Sisyphus was the Greek king condemned
to push a heavy rock up a hill but never to succeed. Such is the fate of modern-day
Cubans, laboring under statist policies that limit their expression of the human
experience through exchange.
Diverse institutions and policies can work reasonably well with human instincts,
however. Time and place create a path-dependent limitation of feasible options.
Nevertheless, such historical processes have not kept modern economists from trying
to uncover a few key policies that hold the greatest promise for growth. In this article,
I explore the fascinating debates in growth theory and public policy of the past half-
century. Adam Smith’s theories suggest a practical way to understand how public
policies can work with instincts to create economic progress.
A Short History of Growth Theory
Modern mainstream economists like to build simple predictive models. Occam’s
razor limits the analysis to a few variables, and we hope we can identify the key one
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that dissolves bottlenecks and brings about rapid growth. Popeye the Sailor had a
magic remedy—spinach—that instantly transformed him. Sleeping Beauty needed
only a kiss to undo her paralysis. Every generation creates its own mythology about
what causes economic takeoff. Stalin thought he had found a panacea in communism,
which stabilized investment spending through government ownership. Mao thought
he could improve on this approach by mandating a steel mill in every backyard.
Autocrats are not the only deluded ones. In the 1950s, Western economists also
had a captivating vision: that economic growth happens through capital infusions
from rich countries to poor countries (just as the Marshall Plan apparently had
worked in Europe). This theory can be illustrated with a biology metaphor. In an
experimental setting, one can vary the amount of fertilizer and record the effect on
plant growth, holding constant the type and quality of soil, the amount and intensity
of sunlight, the amount of water and humidity, and so on. Initial doses of fertilizer
will likely have greater effects on plant growth than later doses. Using this informa-
tion, an omniscient planner might determine how to subsidize fertilizer usage so as to
achieve the desired plant size.
Economists undertake mental experiments of exactly this type. Robert Solow’s
(1956) growth model predicts that greater amounts of capital investment per
worker—holding all else constant—leads to an increase in output per worker. As with
fertilizer, Solow anticipated diminishing returns to capital. Given a certain rate of
savings, a country would eventually reach an equilibrium level of capital per worker
and a corresponding equilibrium output per worker. A policymaker can potentially
raise the living standard by promoting capital “deepening”; that is, an investment tax
credit can increase the equilibrium amount of capital per worker. But such policies
produce only temporary gains, and the economy eventually stabilizes at a new level.
Tax policies cannot lead to sustainable growth in per capita income.
In the real world, we cannot do experiments on whole societies. When some
countries experience rapid growth, it may be because they have the “fertilizer” of
added capital, but growth is likely the result of something else that is changing. When
Solow measured the impact of capital deepening on economic output, he reached a
startling conclusion: more than 85 percent of the observed increase in output per
worker did not derive from greater capital investment—it came from unknown
sources (1957, 320). But what are the mysterious factors that produce growth? Solow
did not know and simply declared that “technical change” had shifted up the produc-
tion function (1957, 312). The terminology unfortunately suggests an improvement
in machinery (for example, a faster computer). In fact, productivity enhancements
may derive from institutions such as laws and norms and from the intangible qualities
of inputs. One of Adam Smith’s key contributions in The Wealth of Nations ([1776]
1981), for example, was to highlight the role of exchange in competitive institutions.
The launching of market reforms—in China after 1978, in Latin America in the
1980s, in India and eastern Europe in the 1990s—presaged the widespread recogni-
tion that global exchange shifts up growth parameters.
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Although economists generally agree on the desirability of markets, they dis-
agree about which public policies work best with markets to produce short- or
long-term growth. “New” growth theorists, such as Paul Romer (1990), try to
rectify this uncertainty by predicting how public policies enhance productivity. The
proposals for ramping up development in the twenty-first century—depending on
the source—are strengthened legal systems and property rights (De Soto 2003),
greater freedom (Friedman and Friedman 1990), better governance (Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 1999), more accommodating culture (Harrison and
Huntington 2000), preschool interventions (Heckman 2008), subsidies for knowl-
edge innovation (Romer 1990), new trade theory industrial policy (Krugman
1994), greater aid redistribution (Sachs 2006), and less aid redistribution (Moyo
2009), among others.
We nevertheless still lack a simple way to account for how public policies pro-
duce wealth or growth across the particular contexts in which growth occurs. One
reason for this shortcoming is that the institutional rules of the game vary greatly,
both in their formal constructs (such as constitutions) and informal applications (such
as customs). Douglass C. North notes: “Institutions are the humanly devised con-
straints that structure political, economic and social interaction. . . . [They] create
order and reduce uncertainty in exchange.”
Economic history is “largely a story of institutional evolution” that is sequential
(1991, 97). Policy analyses should stress path dependency because markets evolve
jointly with competing and supportive institutions such as family, church, tribe,
philanthropy, and politics. Hence, although gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
is often correlated with good governance, the causality is unclear—good governance
may be the result of economic growth, not its cause (Meisel and Aoudia 2007). The
rise of markets often changes moral values, making societies more open, more trust-
worthy, and more generous (B. Friedman 2006; McCloskey 2006).
A further complication is that public policies are intertwined and produce mul-
tiple outcomes, both positive and negative. The net effect may stimulate growth in
some contexts, but the joint product is devilishly difficult to disentangle. For exam-
ple, an Indian program to promote nutrition of existing students in schools discov-
ered that the real impact of a free midday meal was that poor parents now sent more
of their children to school (Reddy and Heuty 2005). Unanticipated and unintended
consequences are the norm and in this case were hailed as a lucky accident for literacy.
The seeker of single answers may insist that technological innovation is the
source of sustainable growth. Surely public policy can stimulate primary research
through direct subsidies or financially stimulate market innovation indirectly through
stronger patent and property rights. But, again, reality is more complex. Innovations
reflect society’s tolerance for creativity (North 1994) and may disrupt tradition and
authority. Many of the great innovations of the twentieth century were the accidental
results of government policy (for example, the Internet and the space race) or were
stimulated by nonfinancial incentives of status and achievement in the private sector
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(for example, the theory of relativity, computing, the coding of the genetic sequence,
and television) (Kay 2004a).
World Data Survey
Although innovation is widely believed to drive the U.S. economy, the same may not
be true for all rapidly growing economies. The share of world output produced by
major advanced economies (the G-7) amounted to about 50 percent in 1990 (Inter-
national Monetary Fund 2009).1 By 2014, that share is expected to fall to 37 percent.
The emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and (South) Korea (BRICK)
will double their shares to nearly 30 percent. Like the United States, both Brazil and
Russia produce industrial products, but also primary product exports, some under
government control. The survey described here reveals a startling diversity of institu-
tions and policies across a spectrum of successful economies.
Figure 1 shows the nations with the highest income per capita in 2009,
restricted to those with populations greater than 1.5 million.2 Norway, the leading
country on the list, maintains a social democracy with a high marginal tax rate of
nearly 50 percent on its most prosperous citizens; government revenues amount to
more than 40 percent of GDP (Heritage Foundation 2010). Singapore, ranked
second, is known for its authoritarian rule that has prohibited antisocial practices,
such as chewing gum (Prystay 2004) and reading the wrong kinds of literature. The
United States, in third place, is in some respects much more free-market oriented,
permitting consumers to buy not only bubble gum but also assault rifles and all
manner of seditious books (such as Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses, banned in
Singapore). Compared to western European countries, the United States has less
stringent regulations of labor markets. Continuing down the list of rich countries,
one uncovers many different approaches to property rights, financial regulations,
subsidies to education and health, government ownership of assets, and so on. In
short, advanced countries use markets along with a smorgasbord of institutions and
policies that have evolved over time in a particular social, political, and economic
ecology.
A second line of inquiry is to examine not the countries with the highest levels of
GDP per capita, but those with the highest growth rates of real GDP per capita over
the past thirty years. Growth rates typically fall as income rises, so figure 2 restricts
the list to countries with populations greater than 1.5 million that have achieved
“upper-middle-income” status according to the World Bank—that is, income of at
least $3,856 per capita by 2009 (World Bank 2010). Once again, all countries on the
1. The G-7 includes the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Canada.
2. Purchasing power parity (PPP) is an international comparison of the cost of living derived by estimating
exchange rates based on a comparable market basket of goods. Alternative measures of welfare (such as life
expectancy, literacy rates, and capabilities) enrich our understanding of the human experience (Stiglitz, Sen,
and Fitoussi 2009). These alternative measures are generally highly correlated with income per capita.
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Figure 2
Average Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita, 1980–2009
Figure 1
GDP per Capita, Purchasing Power Parity
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list have relied on markets for growth, but the relevant institutions and public policies
vary. China reports the fastest economic growth, yet it has had a nontransparent legal
system, high levels of corruption, and questionable property rights, and its govern-
ment continues to carry out massive banking and currency manipulations.3 On a scale
of 0 to 100 in the Index of Economic Freedoms, the Heritage Foundation gives
China a hugely failing grade of 20 for property rights, 30 for financial freedom, and
an overall rating of 51, which makes it “mostly unfree” (Heritage Foundation 2010).
South Korea, solidly developed after fifty years of industrialization, used massive
market intrusions to manipulate industry and trade. In Botswana, the government
spends more than 40 percent of the country’s GDP and distributes free health care to
all citizens. India—booming since 1991 but not on this list because its status is still
below middle income—historically emphasized education at the graduate level,
whereas countries such as Taiwan have emphasized broad-based elementary educa-
tion (World Bank 1993).
Hong Kong, cited by Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman in their influential
series Free to Choose (1990), earned the highest Freedom Index score of 90 (Heritage
Foundation 2010). Yet Hong Kong is by no means a land of laissez-faire. The govern-
ment owns virtually all land and strictly regulates its use. Because of the high housing
prices this policy causes, half of the population lives in government-subsidized
apartments (Chiu 2007). All citizens are eligible for universal health care. Why does
the government have these policies, and what do their costs and benefits presage for
economic progress? When Great Britain owned the colony, most immigrants were
poor, and long-term land leases provided the government with revenues needed
to pay for infrastructure; health policies likely promoted political stability by creating
a shared economic fortune. As Hong Kong citizens have become richer, their
preferences, such as their preference for private medical specialists, may have changed.
But history creates a path dependency that constrains future policy choices. Privatizing
land would unleash market forces but might set in motion negative social repercussions
that cannot be predicted. Thus, neither Hong Kong nor mainland China seems likely to
privatize land ownership.
Trading Occam’s Razor for an Invisible Hand
Before we abandon hope of finding anything universal to say about the causes of
growth, let’s recall the image of Sisyphus laboring with his rock. Just as it is folly to
think that successful policies can be easily transferred across time and place, it may be
greater folly to continue down a path that is clearly wrong. Social experiments are
devices for learning. The greatest socioeconomic experiment of the modern era took
place when the Soviet Union and China wrenchingly attempted to obliterate history
3. Chinese statistics are also questionable (“China’s Unreliable Economic Statistics” 2009).
PUBLIC POLICY, HUMAN INSTINCTS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH F 357
VOLUME 15, NUMBER 3, WINTER 2011
and culture and to centralize authority around the notion that an economy should be
run on the principles of a communal family: “From each according to ability, to each
according to his needs.” The abject failure of this approach suggests that although
there are layers of analysis, each must begin by recognizing fundamental human
nature.
In the twentieth century, economists focused on the aspect of human nature
related to rational self-interest. In the twenty-first century, economists have relaxed
this assumption to delve into dimensions of behavioral irrationality (Kahneman and
Tversky 2000) and of other-regarding behavior that might arise from evolutionary
adaptations (D. Friedman 2008). Human nature is complex because it comprises
different instincts needed not only for survival in the wild, but also for successful
cooperation in a village. This discovery is essentially the message of the invisible hand
(Evensky 1993; Wight 2007).
The conviction that instincts are the starting point for social and market analysis
was a theme developed by Adam Smith (1732–90), the Scottish founder of modern
economics. Because rationality is often weak, Smith proposed that nature provides a
more reliable mechanism through instinctive responses. As is well known, Smith did
not think that the instinct for serving oneself alone is sufficient to achieve the aims of
nature because humans are fundamentally social creatures. Selfish instincts must be
held in check by both internal and external forces, as elaborated in The Theory of Moral
Sentiments ([1759] 1982b). Smith postulated three kinds of instincts: for oneself,
which is the important source of prudence; for others, which is the source of benevo-
lence; and against others, which is the source of justice.
The instinct for self is strongest at birth, when one’s survival hangs in the
balance. A baby cries for itself when it is hungry, cold, or afraid. Other instincts, such
as “fellow feeling,” develop over time. Mutual sympathy renders the other’s happi-
ness necessary for one’s own (Smith [1759] 1982b, 7). At approximately two years of
age, more complex social ability appears: the child gains the sense of perspective,
which forms the basis for moral thinking about right and wrong. A well-socialized
child starts to develop self-control. Concern for self and benevolence toward others
are important building blocks, but they are inadequate without a third instinct—the
unsocial instinct for revenge against injustice. Justice is the “pillar” without which
social organization would “crumble into atoms” ([1759] 1982b, 86). Hence, all
three sets of instincts serve social functions.
Modern experiments corroborate Smith’s theories. The pathways for sympathy
are said to have been discovered in the mirror neurons of the brain (Umilta et al.
2001). Chemical hormones such as oxytocin (the “trust” molecule) are released to
create emotional bonds during breast feeding and during economic exchange (Zak
2008). Numerous researchers have found evidence that people are predisposed to
trust others and to treat them fairly, particularly in advanced market economies
(Gintis et al. 2005). Subjects willingly incur a personal cost to punish those who fail
to show proper concern for fairness, even in double-blind, one-time experiments in
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which reciprocity cannot occur.4 Although “enlightened self-interest” can produce
trustworthy behavior as a result of reputational effects, Smith noted that calculated
honesty is “much inferior” to honesty ingrained by habit and moral reflection
([1759] 1982b, 263). Moral capital is an important source of social capital, as noted
in The Wealth of Nations: the invisible hand of the market worked in Great Britain
because of the trust that arose from knowing the “character” of one’s business
associates ([1776] 1981, 454).
Instincts give rise to behavior in a complex mix of moral norms, legal rules, and
customs that develop over centuries and cannot be easily imposed. North notes that
“there is no guarantee that the beliefs and institutions that evolve through time will
produce economic growth” (1994, 363). For one thing, growth may not serve
society’s individual or collective needs at a particular point in time. During the Middle
Ages, the instinct for security generated the rigid feudal property rights of primogen-
iture and engrossing (the exclusive possession of uncultivated lands by lords) that
made society safer from internal strife and invasion. Smith lamented that such “[l]aws
frequently continue in force long after the circumstances, which first gave occasion to
them, and which could alone render them reasonable, are no more” ([1776] 1981,
383). Although formal property rights for women exist today in many African coun-
tries, they are likewise routinely ignored because of cultural norms.
Making Policies Work
Seen in this light, the invisible hand is not the market, not self-interest alone, and not
a tendency toward efficiency, but rather a collection of instincts manifesting them-
selves in social and institutional settings. Robert Nozick, the political philosopher,
astutely observes that “not every pattern that arises by an invisible-hand process is
desirable” (1994, 314). In some cases, self-interest runs rampant, and mechanisms
of self-control are weak. If laws of justice fail to become embedded in day-to-day
behavior—because of corruption and a misalignment of policies with natural
instincts—efforts are devoted to upending the system. In Africa, systemic problems
of justice pit tribe against tribe and leader against citizen in the division of economic
rents. Effort is expended to take rather than to produce.
Properly designed institutions create appropriate tension by structuring incen-
tives to encourage productivity without free riding (Rosenberg 1960). For the invis-
ible hand to work well, “incentive compatibility” must prevail between natural
passions and human institutions (Makowski and Ostroy 2004, 6). Policies that work
with human instincts will more reliably create opportunities for progress. Economists
play a central role in developing innovative policies that conform to this principle.
John J. Siegfried’s collected volume Better Living Through Economics (2010), for
4. “Fairness” in this context means what is equitable, not what is equal.
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example, highlights twelve successful policy innovations over the past half-century,
including the all-volunteer army, airline deregulation, trade liberalization, the earned-
income tax credit, welfare reform, and markets for pollution permits. In each case,
incentives work with the instinct of self-betterment to achieve desirable ends that are
measureable and accountable. Other successes might include the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, charter schools, vitamin A enrichments, malarial nets, oral rehydration
therapy, and other high-benefit/low-cost discoveries that are nonrival and can be
widely shared and locally implemented.
One institution that is essential for invisible-hand reforms is competition—in
markets, in governments, and in ideas. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith
discusses people’s instinct for creating order, which is desirable as long as it is kept in
check. Mao Zedong exemplifies a modern “man of system” (Smith [1759] 1982b,
233–34) who—after eliminating the competition—egoistically imposed on society his
own “ideal” plan of order, wrecking China in the process. Top-down policies rou-
tinely encounter this problem because they arrogantly thrust aside local interests,
institutions, and norms. The results are at best uncertain: “[O]utcomes emerge
that may in some respects be meaningfully measured but that cannot be chosen,
and thereby controlled, by concentrated decision takers,” says James Buchanan
(2009, 152).
Policies fail when they are poorly suited for the microsystems of society and
commerce. Elinor Ostrom won the Nobel Prize in 2009 for demonstrating that
natural self-organization often arises at such lower levels to solve a problem such as
the tragedy of the commons. Ostrom set forth some of the properties of evolving
local governance: “a large number of contextual variables affects the processes of
teaching and evoking social norms; of informing participants about the behavior of
others and their adherence to social norms; and of rewarding those who use social
norms, such as reciprocity, trust, and fairness” (2000, 154).
Microlending, for example, is a hugely successful innovation that relies on
Smith’s invisible hand and appropriate social norms. Mohammed Yunus (2003) acci-
dentally discovered that the world’s most plentiful entrepreneurs are home workers in
rural villages. Men migrate for work, leaving women behind to tend the fields and
care for the family. Although villagers lack the financial or real assets needed as
collateral for traditional loans, the instinct for self-betterment can still be unleashed.
Yunus employed women’s social capital (reputations and psychological bonds in the
community) as an ingenious form of collateral for business loans. Small economic
advances lead to greater psychological breakthroughs as women find themselves
empowered to deal with wider problems in their communities. Social status and trust
are now known to be a factor in efficient production, and microlending has been
successfully replicated around the world. One disturbing issue lingers, however: gen-
der discrimination. Men are routinely excluded from microloans because they are
thought to lack self-control and have weaker emotional social bonds. The sources of
gender differences may be deeply rooted in both culture and genetics. The rise in the
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women’s status will have profound social, economic, and political effects over time,
calling forth new policies and institutions. It is significant that Yunus, who also
received a Nobel Prize for his work, did not set out to deduce a new principle of
finance: it was uncovered by local experience and experimentation.
Experiment, Failure, and Fresh Experiment
Societies that create workable institutions for unleashing the instinct of self-better-
ment within a system of justice will grow and progress, despite all of the obstacles
thrown up by imperfect policies. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith chides a reformer
who seeks only “perfect” institutions and policies: “[He seems] to have imagined that
[society] would thrive and prosper only under a certain precise regimen, the exact
regimen of perfect liberty and perfect justice. He seems not to have considered that,
in the political body, the natural effort which every man is continually making to
better his own condition, is a principle of preservation capable of preventing and
correcting, in many respects, the bad effects of a political economy” ([1776] 1981,
673–74). Attempting to implement an ideal or perfect system would be a fool’s
errand, because culture, history, and path dependency produce acceptable alternatives
that work reasonably well—indeed, often better than those derived from pure theory.
Although Smith’s rhetoric on free trade was soaring and ideological, his actual policy
prescriptions were context specific and incremental. Hence, he argued that opening a
nation to trade should be done gradually and reflect concern for justice and process:
“Humanity may in this case require that the freedom of trade should be restored only
by slow gradations, and with a good deal of reserve and circumspection” ([1776]
1981, 469).
Dani Rodrik mirrors Smith’s “reserve and circumspection” in One Economics,
Many Recipes (2007). Economics is the analysis of incentives that operate on human
instincts, but costs and benefits vary greatly around the world, producing divergent
recipes for success. The 1990s “Washington Consensus”—the unswerving set of
reforms for market liberalization (Williamson 1990)—has been largely scrapped
because of its “cookie-cutter” mentality, which fails to take account of local context.
An inductive, experimental approach is preferable when systems are “complex, imper-
fectly understood, and change their nature as we engage with them” (Kay 2004b). If
these arguments carry weight, they imply a bright future for policy innovations based
on incremental, fact-driven reforms that are responsive to local environments. Society
will advance by practicing “disciplined pluralism”—that is, “experiment, failure, fresh
experiment” (Kay 2004a, 127).
I began this article by asking why Botswana has experienced growth, but Zambia
has not. My explorations suggest that we should examine how the instincts for
betterment were unleashed in one country but thwarted in the other. This project
requires knowledge of history, social and moral norms, and institutions of justice. It
requires a path analysis of previous policies, including both those that succeeded and
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those that failed. The British created a colonial system that promoted the develop-
ment of indigenous leaders. One of them, the tribal chief Sir Seretse Khama, briefly
studied at Balliol College, Oxford, where Adam Smith had studied. Khama became
the first president of Botswana after independence. In a magnanimous gesture of
unity, he ceded the property rights in diamond mines from his own tribe to the
national government, thus creating an incentive for every tribe to demand account-
ability in the mines’ development (Commission on Growth and Development 2008,
27). Revenues were guarded from corruption and invested in health, education, and
infrastructure. Markets were fostered through low taxes and trade. We should ask,
What made Khama the kind of statesman who would propose these policies rather
than seek his own enrichment? As a lawyer, he was initially exiled from Botswana for
marrying a British white woman. In a strange twist, moral suasion both internally
and externally led to his homecoming and ultimate entry into politics. Character and
conviction were forged by his ancestral tribal roots, by education in South Africa and
England, and by personal struggle. Luck played a role when these factors converged
on a market approach in Botswana; Zambia was not so fortunate.
We can draw tentative and humble conclusions from this story, which may lead
to proposals for policy experiments in other times and places. Adam Smith inspires
good policymaking by linking timeless instincts to local circumstances. He is a realist
who in the best of times would say of a newly adopted policy: “With all its imperfec-
tions . . . it is the best which the interests, prejudices, and temper of the times would
admit of. It may perhaps in due time prepare the way for a better [one]” ([1776]
1981, 543).
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